This monograph analyzes in detail a crucial section of Central European diplomacy history, the focus of which is the so-called 'Austrian question' in the period from 1933-1936. At that time Austria was not a subject, but an object in the game of the European powers, especially the German Empire and Italy. As such, the small Alpine state was probably important for equilibrium and European peace, but was hardly in a position to pursue a self-determined foreign policy. German-Austrian relations were overshadowed by political violence, especially before the July Agreement, and largely did not correspond to normal principles of international law. Austria was seen by Hitler, who largely eliminated the Foreign Office on this issue, as a domestic political problem of the whole of Germany and not as part of a European question. Since the great powers, especially Italy, recognized the importance for the European equilibrium and thus also for their own security and position of power, the Austrian problem also led to serious bilateral burdens in Europe. The work is largely based on unprinted and printed sources from Italian, Austrian, German and occasionally French and British archives. Above all, the as yet little evaluated Italian documents not only expand knowledge of foreign but also of domestic political processes in what was then Austria. The interdependencies of the powers on the Austrian question in the entire European context were chosen as a consistent approach.